Composite Identity, Protocol Handshake, and Evidence Repository Hybrid post-quantum governance framework for Model Context Protocol infrastructure.
Accompanies: Composite Trust for Cognitive Workloads: Hybrid Post-Quantum Identity and Handshake Hardening for AI Agent Protocols — ACM QSec 2026 / Elsevier FGCS 2026.
Author: Sunil Gentyala, HCLTech | IEEE Senior Member 101760715 | ORCID 0009-0005-2642-3479
cipher-mcp-pqc/
├── artifacts/
│ ├── A1-HHF-enforcer/ Layer 1: Hybrid Handshake Floor
│ │ ├── openssl-hybrid.conf OpenSSL 3.5 config for X25519MLKEM768
│ │ └── hhf_monitor.py TLS session compliance monitor + middlebox probe
│ ├── A2-CCRS-evaluator/ Layer 2: Composite Certificate Readiness Score
│ │ └── ccrs_score.py Certificate chain evaluator (score 0-5)
│ ├── A3-composite-svid/ Layer 3: Composite SVID Policy (SPIFFE workaround)
│ │ └── composite_svid_gen.go ML-DSA-65 + ECDSA-P256 SVID generator (Go)
│ └── A4-HRSP-middleware/ Layer 4: Hybrid Result Signature Policy
│ └── hrsp_middleware.py Detached ML-DSA-65 result signature verifier
├── benchmarks/
│ ├── harness/ Go MCP stub server and bench client
│ └── results_raw.csv 50,000-run handshake benchmark dataset
├── paper/
│ ├── ACM_CIPHER_v5_ACMTemplate.docx
│ └── FGCS_CIPHER_FINAL_v3.docx
├── CITATION.cff
├── LICENSE
└── README.md
| Control | Layer | Addresses | Policy Tiers |
|---|---|---|---|
| HHF | TLS key exchange | V1: Quantum-vulnerable handshake | Monitor / Prefer / Require |
| CCRS | Certificate PKI | V2: Single-algorithm X.509 certs | Score 0-5 per endpoint |
| CSP | Workload identity | V3: Classical SPIFFE/SPIRE SVIDs | Monitor / Prefer / Require |
| HRSP | Tool result provenance | V4: Unsigned tool results | Monitor / Prefer / Require |
# Check compliance from TLS session logs
pip install -r artifacts/A1-HHF-enforcer/requirements.txt
python artifacts/A1-HHF-enforcer/hhf_monitor.py \
--log /var/log/mcp/tls.log \
--probe mcp.example.com \
--output report.jsonpip install cryptography pyopenssl
python artifacts/A2-CCRS-evaluator/ccrs_score.py \
--host mcp.example.com --port 443Output example:
CIPHER CCRS Evaluation
Host: mcp.example.com:443
CCRS Score: 3 / 5
Rationale: PQ intermediate detected. Parallel PKI deployment. Root remains quantum-vulnerable.
Chain depth: 3
Chain:
[0] Leaf: mcp.example.com (traditional)
[1] Intermediate: Corp CA (ML-DSA-65)
[2] Root: Corp Root (traditional)
go run artifacts/A3-composite-svid/composite_svid_gen.go \
--spiffe-id spiffe://example.com/agent/research-agent \
--output ./certs/ \
--ttl 24hImportant: For production use, replace the ML-DSA-65 stub key generation
with liboqs-go (github.com/open-quantum-safe/liboqs-go). The stub uses
random bytes of the correct length (1,952-byte public key, 4,032-byte private
key per FIPS 204) to allow pipeline testing without CGO build requirements.
Identity binding: both the SPIRE-issued SVID and the composite certificate must contain the same SPIFFE URI in the Subject Alternative Name extension. The MCP server verifies both URIs match before accepting the credential pair.
pip install -r artifacts/A4-HRSP-middleware/requirements.txt
# Monitor mode (no enforcement, collect metrics)
python artifacts/A4-HRSP-middleware/hrsp_middleware.py \
--mode monitor --port 8080 --upstream http://mcp-server:8000
# Prefer mode (flag unsigned, allow through with warning)
python artifacts/A4-HRSP-middleware/hrsp_middleware.py \
--mode prefer --port 8080 --upstream http://mcp-server:8000
# Require mode (EXPERIMENTAL: unsigned results quarantined)
# Only use after draft-ietf-cose-dilithium-11 reaches RFC status
python artifacts/A4-HRSP-middleware/hrsp_middleware.py \
--mode require --port 8080 --upstream http://mcp-server:8000| Standard | Status | Use in CIPHER |
|---|---|---|
| FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) | Finalized Aug 2024 | A1: HHF key exchange |
| FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) | Finalized Aug 2024 | A3: SVID, A4: HRSP |
| FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) | Finalized Aug 2024 | A2: CCRS offline CA roots |
| RFC 9794 | Published Jun 2025 | Framework taxonomy |
| draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem-04 | RFC Editor queue | A1: X25519MLKEM768 |
| draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs-16 | Standards Track | A2: CCRS scoring |
| draft-ietf-cose-dilithium-11 | Standards Track | A4: HRSP alg identifiers (EXPERIMENTAL) |
@software{gentyala2026cipher,
author = {Gentyala, Sunil},
title = {CIPHER-MCP-PQC: Hybrid Post-Quantum Governance for MCP},
year = {2026},
version = {v1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.XXXXXXX},
url = {https://github.com/sunilgentyala/cipher-mcp-pqc},
orcid = {0009-0005-2642-3479}
}
@inproceedings{gentyala2026composite,
author = {Gentyala, Sunil},
title = {Composite Trust for Cognitive Workloads: Hybrid Post-Quantum Identity
and Handshake Hardening for {AI} Agent Protocols},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography Security (QSec '26)},
year = {2026},
publisher = {ACM},
doi = {10.1145/XXXXXXX.XXXXXXX}
}MIT License. See LICENSE for details.