Dashboard: route XvB stats through Tor + gate behind XVB_ENABLED (IP↔wallet leak)

[VijitSingh97]

Part of #160 (privacy egress epic).

The worst leak in the stack: the dashboard fetches XvB stats over clearnet with the operator's wallet address as a query param, from a network_mode: host container — correlating real IP ↔ Monero wallet. And it's not gated by XVB_ENABLED, so disabling XvB doesn't stop it.

build/dashboard/mining_dashboard/client/xvb_client.py:37 → requests.get("https://xmrvsbeast.com/cgi-bin/p2pool_bonus_history.cgi?address=<WALLET>"), called unconditionally from service/data_service.py:482 (~every 5 min).

Changes

• Route through Tor. requests.get(..., proxies={"https": "socks5h://172.28.0.25:9050"}) — the host-net dashboard can reach the bridge Tor SOCKS at 172.28.0.25:9050; socks5h resolves the hostname via Tor too (no local DNS leak). Add the requests[socks]/PySocks dependency to the dashboard image. xmrvsbeast still receives the wallet (inherent to the query) but no longer tied to your IP.
• Gate behind ENABLE_XVB in data_service so turning XvB off actually stops the egress.
• Remove dead code: TARI_EXPLORER_URL in config/config.py:135 (defined, never called).

Acceptance

• With XvB on, tcpdump on the host shows the xmrvsbeast request exiting via Tor (to 172.28.0.25:9050), not direct to xmrvsbeast over clearnet.
• With xvb.enabled: false, no request to xmrvsbeast.com is made at all.

Labels: dashboard, security · Milestone: v1.0

Related issues

• [Epic] Privacy: no clearnet egress outside Tor — close leaks + privacy-first defaults #160 — tracking epic
• XvB donation: route mining upstream through Tor by default + pin --donate-level 0 (xvb.tor opt-out) #166 — XvB donation over Tor (shares the xvb.* config + algo_service path)
• XvB 'stats updated' timestamp is bumped every algo cycle, not when xmrvsbeast.com is actually fetched — misleading freshness #136 — XvB "stats updated" freshness timestamp (this issue changes when/whether the fetch runs)
• SSRF: miner-controlled worker name/IP becomes an outbound request host from the host-networked dashboard #122, Security follow-ups: dashboard host-networking, Tari gRPC allow-list, assert_safe_dir #91 — host-networked dashboard egress / SSRF + host-networking hardening (same surface)
• Docs: add docs/privacy.md egress reference + correct 'home IP not exposed' overclaims #164 — privacy/egress docs covering this fix