feat(path): add NewPathFromURI for ipfs:// URIs

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ The following emojis are used to highlight certain changes:
 ### Added
 
 - `gateway`: `GET`/`HEAD /ipfs/bafkqaaa?format=raw` now always returns `200` with an empty body, so probing clients keep marking the gateway as functional even when its backend cannot serve identity CIDs. `bitswap/network/httpnet` sends this [trustless gateway probe](https://specs.ipfs.tech/http-gateways/trustless-gateway/#dedicated-probe-paths) to check providers, and a failed probe drops the provider. Exported as `gateway.EmptyIdentityCID`. [#1179](https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/pull/1179)
+- `path`: added `NewPathFromURI`, which accepts native IPFS URIs (`ipfs://cid`, `ipns://name`, `ipld://cid`, and the schemeless `ipfs:`/`ipns:`/`ipld:` forms) and rewrites them to canonical content paths, so values copied from browsers and other tools parse as-is. `NewPath` stays strict and still rejects URI-shaped input, leaving untrusted parsing such as DNSLink records unchanged. [#1182](https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/pull/1182)
 
 ### Changed
 

path/path.go

@@ -129,6 +129,10 @@ func FromCid(cid cid.Cid) ImmutablePath {
 // The given string is cleaned through [gopath.Clean], but preserving the final
 // trailing slash. This function returns an error when the given string is not
 // a valid content path.
+//
+// NewPath is strict: it accepts only canonical content paths (/ipfs, /ipns,
+// /ipld). To also accept native IPFS URIs such as ipfs://{cid}, use
+// [NewPathFromURI].
 func NewPath(str string) (Path, error) {
 	segments := StringToSegments(str)
 

path/uri.go

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+package path
+
+import "strings"
+
+// NewPathFromURI is like [NewPath] but also accepts a native IPFS URI, rewriting
+// it to the equivalent canonical content path before parsing:
+//
+//	ipfs://{cid}/sub  -> /ipfs/{cid}/sub
+//	ipns://{name}/sub -> /ipns/{name}/sub
+//	ipld://{cid}/sub  -> /ipld/{cid}/sub
+//
+// The schemeless ipfs:{cid}, ipns:{name}, and ipld:{cid} forms are accepted too.
+// The scheme is matched case-insensitively over ASCII, as URI schemes are
+// case-insensitive (RFC 3986). Everything after the scheme is preserved
+// byte-for-byte, so a case-sensitive CIDv0 root or a DNSLink name is not altered.
+// A string that is already a content path, or is not an IPFS URI, is handed to
+// [NewPath] unchanged.
+//
+// Use this only at input boundaries where values may be copied from a browser or
+// another tool. [NewPath] stays strict, so contexts that must accept canonical
+// content paths only (such as DNSLink records) are not loosened by this helper.
+func NewPathFromURI(str string) (Path, error) {
+	return NewPath(normalizeURIScheme(str))
+}
+
+// normalizeURIScheme rewrites a native IPFS URI into a canonical content path.
+// A string that is not an IPFS URI is returned unchanged. See [NewPathFromURI].
+func normalizeURIScheme(str string) string {
+	for _, ns := range [...]string{IPFSNamespace, IPNSNamespace, IPLDNamespace} {
+		if hasURIScheme(str, ns) {
+			rest := strings.TrimPrefix(str[len(ns)+1:], "//") // drop the optional "//" authority separator
+			return "/" + ns + "/" + rest
+		}
+	}
+	return str
+}
+
+// hasURIScheme reports whether str begins with the scheme ns followed by ":"
+// (e.g. "ipfs:"). ns is matched case-insensitively over ASCII.
+func hasURIScheme(str, ns string) bool {
+	if len(str) <= len(ns) || str[len(ns)] != ':' {
+		return false
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < len(ns); i++ {
+		if toLowerASCII(str[i]) != ns[i] {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func toLowerASCII(b byte) byte {
+	if b >= 'A' && b <= 'Z' {
+		return b + ('a' - 'A')
+	}
+	return b
+}

path/uri_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+package path
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+)
+
+func TestNewPathFromURI(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	t.Run("Valid URIs", func(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Parallel()
+
+		testCases := []struct {
+			src       string
+			canonical string
+			namespace string
+			mutable   bool
+		}{
+			// ipfs:// with CIDv1, with and without a sub-path
+			{"ipfs://bafybeihdwdcefgh4dqkjv67uzcmw7ojee6xedzdetojuzjevtenxquvyku", "/ipfs/bafybeihdwdcefgh4dqkjv67uzcmw7ojee6xedzdetojuzjevtenxquvyku", IPFSNamespace, false},
+			{"ipfs://bafybeihdwdcefgh4dqkjv67uzcmw7ojee6xedzdetojuzjevtenxquvyku/a/b", "/ipfs/bafybeihdwdcefgh4dqkjv67uzcmw7ojee6xedzdetojuzjevtenxquvyku/a/b", IPFSNamespace, false},
+
+			// CIDv0 is base58 and case-sensitive: the root must survive untouched.
+			{"ipfs://QmdfTbBqBPQ7VNxZEYEj14VmRuZBkqFbiwReogJgS1zR1n", "/ipfs/QmdfTbBqBPQ7VNxZEYEj14VmRuZBkqFbiwReogJgS1zR1n", IPFSNamespace, false},
+			{"ipfs://QmdfTbBqBPQ7VNxZEYEj14VmRuZBkqFbiwReogJgS1zR1n/a", "/ipfs/QmdfTbBqBPQ7VNxZEYEj14VmRuZBkqFbiwReogJgS1zR1n/a", IPFSNamespace, false},
+
+			// ipns:// with an IPNS key and with a DNSLink name
+			{"ipns://bafybeihdwdcefgh4dqkjv67uzcmw7ojee6xedzdetojuzjevtenxquvyku", "/ipns/bafybeihdwdcefgh4dqkjv67uzcmw7ojee6xedzdetojuzjevtenxquvyku", IPNSNamespace, true},
+			{"ipns://docs.ipfs.tech/concepts", "/ipns/docs.ipfs.tech/concepts", IPNSNamespace, true},
+
+			// ipld:// maps to the /ipld namespace
+			{"ipld://bafybeihdwdcefgh4dqkjv67uzcmw7ojee6xedzdetojuzjevtenxquvyku/a", "/ipld/bafybeihdwdcefgh4dqkjv67uzcmw7ojee6xedzdetojuzjevtenxquvyku/a", IPLDNamespace, false},
+
+			// Schemeless forms: ipfs:{cid}, ipns:{name}, ipld:{cid}
+			{"ipfs:bafkqaaa", "/ipfs/bafkqaaa", IPFSNamespace, false},
+			{"ipns:docs.ipfs.tech", "/ipns/docs.ipfs.tech", IPNSNamespace, true},
+			{"ipld:bafkqaaa", "/ipld/bafkqaaa", IPLDNamespace, false},
+
+			// Scheme is case-insensitive (RFC 3986); the rest is preserved.
+			{"IPFS://bafkqaaa", "/ipfs/bafkqaaa", IPFSNamespace, false},
+			{"IpNs://docs.ipfs.tech", "/ipns/docs.ipfs.tech", IPNSNamespace, true},
+
+			// Trailing slash is preserved, mirroring /ipfs/cid/ behaviour.
+			{"ipfs://bafkqaaa/", "/ipfs/bafkqaaa/", IPFSNamespace, false},
+
+			// Cleaning still applies after normalization.
+			{"ipfs://bafkqaaa/a/b/../c", "/ipfs/bafkqaaa/a/c", IPFSNamespace, false},
+
+			// A canonical path passes straight through to NewPath.
+			{"/ipfs/bafkqaaa", "/ipfs/bafkqaaa", IPFSNamespace, false},
+			{"/ipns/docs.ipfs.tech", "/ipns/docs.ipfs.tech", IPNSNamespace, true},
+		}
+
+		for _, testCase := range testCases {
+			p, err := NewPathFromURI(testCase.src)
+			assert.NoErrorf(t, err, "input %q", testCase.src)
+			if err != nil {
+				continue
+			}
+			assert.Equalf(t, testCase.canonical, p.String(), "input %q", testCase.src)
+			assert.Equalf(t, testCase.namespace, p.Namespace(), "input %q", testCase.src)
+			assert.Equalf(t, testCase.mutable, p.Mutable(), "input %q", testCase.src)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Invalid URIs still error", func(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Parallel()
+
+		// Empty-after-scheme reduces to "/ipfs/" etc., which NewPath rejects.
+		for _, src := range []string{"ipfs:", "ipns:", "ipld:", "ipfs://", "ipns://", "IPFS://"} {
+			_, err := NewPathFromURI(src)
+			assert.ErrorIsf(t, err, ErrInsufficientComponents, "input %q", src)
+			assert.ErrorIsf(t, err, &ErrInvalidPath{}, "input %q always an ErrInvalidPath", src)
+		}
+
+		// A malformed CID still fails (as an ErrInvalidPath wrapping the CID error).
+		_, err := NewPathFromURI("ipfs://notacid")
+		assert.ErrorIs(t, err, &ErrInvalidPath{})
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Returns ImmutablePath for ipfs:// URIs", func(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Parallel()
+
+		p, err := NewPathFromURI("ipfs://bafybeihdwdcefgh4dqkjv67uzcmw7ojee6xedzdetojuzjevtenxquvyku/a")
+		assert.NoError(t, err)
+		assert.IsType(t, ImmutablePath{}, p)
+	})
+
+	// A literal value that merely starts with "ipns"/"ipfs" but has no ":" right
+	// after the namespace must not be rewritten.
+	t.Run("Does not misfire on non-URI input", func(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Parallel()
+
+		for _, src := range []string{"ipfsfile", "ipns-notes.txt", "ipfsbar:baz", "ipns", "/ipfs/bafkqaaa"} {
+			assert.Equalf(t, src, normalizeURIScheme(src), "input %q must be unchanged", src)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// TestNewPathStaysStrict guards the security boundary: NewPath itself must keep
+// rejecting native IPFS URIs, so contexts that parse untrusted strings (such as
+// DNSLink records) are not loosened. Only NewPathFromURI accepts URIs.
+func TestNewPathStaysStrict(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, src := range []string{
+		"ipfs://bafybeihdwdcefgh4dqkjv67uzcmw7ojee6xedzdetojuzjevtenxquvyku",
+		"ipns://attacker.example",
+		"ipfs:bafkqaaa",
+		"ipns:attacker.example",
+	} {
+		_, err := NewPath(src)
+		assert.Errorf(t, err, "NewPath must reject URI %q", src)
+		assert.ErrorIsf(t, err, &ErrInvalidPath{}, "input %q", src)
+	}
+}