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ci: fix zizmor audit findings - #4200

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ci/zizmor-audit-fixes
Apr 3, 2026
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ci: fix zizmor audit findings#4200
dsanders11 merged 3 commits into
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ci/zizmor-audit-fixes

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Fixes zizmor audit findings surfaced in the latest scheduled audit run.

Auto-fixes applied:

  • dependabot-cooldown: added 7-day default cooldown for github-actions updates
  • artipacked: added persist-credentials: false to all actions/checkout steps
  • cache-poisoning: added lookup-only: true to ESLint cache step
  • template-injection: moved steps.version.outputs.version into env var in release.yml

Manual fixes:

  • excessive-permissions: added top-level permissions: {} block to ci.yml, gh-pages.yml, and release.yml, plus minimal contents: read job-level grants where needed

Remaining (low-confidence) findings:

  • 5 cache-poisoning warnings on actions/setup-node calls. These are flagged because the workflows are triggered by tag/branch pushes (publishing-style triggers). In ci.yml the cache is commented out, and in gh-pages.yml yarn caching is needed for the docs build. These have low audit confidence and are accepted as known.

cc @dsanders11

@dsanders11
dsanders11 marked this pull request as ready for review April 2, 2026 22:13
@dsanders11
dsanders11 requested a review from a team as a code owner April 2, 2026 22:13
@dsanders11
dsanders11 added this pull request to the merge queue Apr 3, 2026
Merged via the queue into main with commit f126250 Apr 3, 2026
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@dsanders11
dsanders11 deleted the ci/zizmor-audit-fixes branch April 3, 2026 00:32
claude Bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 2, 2026
Applies the GitHub Actions security hardening from #4200 (main) to the
next branch's reworked workflows:

- Add top-level least-privilege `permissions: {}` to ci.yml, release.yml
  and gh-pages.yml, with scoped `permissions:` on jobs that need write
  access (the release publish job's existing contents/id-token trusted
  publishing permissions are preserved).
- Add `persist-credentials: false` to every actions/checkout step.
- Avoid expression injection in the release step by passing the version
  through an environment variable.
- Mark the add-to-project pull_request_target trigger with a zizmor
  dangerous-triggers ignore.
- Add a dependabot cooldown (default-days: 7).

Co-authored-by: Samuel Attard <sattard@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: David Sanders <dsanders11@ucsbalum.com>
erickzhao pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 2, 2026
Applies the GitHub Actions security hardening from #4200 (main) to the
next branch's reworked workflows:

- Add top-level least-privilege `permissions: {}` to ci.yml, release.yml
  and gh-pages.yml, with scoped `permissions:` on jobs that need write
  access (the release publish job's existing contents/id-token trusted
  publishing permissions are preserved).
- Add `persist-credentials: false` to every actions/checkout step.
- Avoid expression injection in the release step by passing the version
  through an environment variable.
- Mark the add-to-project pull_request_target trigger with a zizmor
  dangerous-triggers ignore.
- Add a dependabot cooldown (default-days: 7).

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Attard <sattard@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: David Sanders <dsanders11@ucsbalum.com>
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2 participants