Impact
Vulnerability Type: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File (CWE-532)
Affected Component: Remote Support Module / NethSecurity Controller
Description:
When a remote control session is activated, the temporary session ID (which acts as the authentication password for support) is printed in plain text within the system logs to facilitate support operations.
Example of leaked data on the NethServer core:
Transmit the following session ID to the support team: xxxxx0-xxxx-5898-b32f-2690e792064e
In environments where the NethSecurity Controller is running on NethServer 8, a second, more specific leak occurs. During the activation of the remote user on the controller, a podman exec operation is logged, exposing the password setting command in the container history.
Executing the following command reveals the password in the logs:
{module_id="nethsecurity-controller1"} |= "SET password"
Attack Chain:
This leak, combined with the following vulnerabilities, allows an attacker to exfiltrate the session ID and gain full access to the cluster:
- Access to Cluster services including logs
- Simplified access to Cluster logs
If an attacker has read access to logs (via a local shell or the previously reported Grafana/VPN vulnerability), they can extract the active session ID. If the remote session is still open, the attacker can hijack the support connection to gain administrative control.
Workarounds
- Mandatory Session Termination: Administrators must manually close the remote support session immediately after the support task is completed. Leaving the session active leaves the "door open" for anyone who has read the logs.
- Log Purging: After a support session, consider clearing or rotating logs to remove the plain-text session ID.
Impact
Vulnerability Type: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File (CWE-532)
Affected Component: Remote Support Module / NethSecurity Controller
Description:
When a remote control session is activated, the temporary session ID (which acts as the authentication password for support) is printed in plain text within the system logs to facilitate support operations.
Example of leaked data on the NethServer core:
Transmit the following session ID to the support team: xxxxx0-xxxx-5898-b32f-2690e792064eIn environments where the NethSecurity Controller is running on NethServer 8, a second, more specific leak occurs. During the activation of the remote user on the controller, a
podman execoperation is logged, exposing the password setting command in the container history.Executing the following command reveals the password in the logs:
{module_id="nethsecurity-controller1"} |= "SET password"Attack Chain:
This leak, combined with the following vulnerabilities, allows an attacker to exfiltrate the session ID and gain full access to the cluster:
If an attacker has read access to logs (via a local shell or the previously reported Grafana/VPN vulnerability), they can extract the active session ID. If the remote session is still open, the attacker can hijack the support connection to gain administrative control.
Workarounds