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Policy Engine Architecture

Status as of branch feat/v0.7.0-grand-slam (HEAD 12a7f29, 2026-05-14, post fold-J/roadmap-audit pass). Documents what ships in v0.7.0 Option B (PE-1 / PE-2 / PE-3 all merged on grand-slam) and what is explicitly v0.8.0 future scope (epic #697 with 8 sub-tasks V08-PE-1 … V08-PE-8).

Audit honesty. Every capability described in the present tense maps to shipped code at HEAD 12a7f29. Every "future scope" item names the v0.8.0 epic sub-task and never reads as a present-tense claim. The historical "in flight" framing in §3.2 / §4.3 (preserved verbatim for trace-back) reflects the doc's authoring point at HEAD c359e89; the fold-J audit pass updated §3 status to reflect the merged code at HEAD 12a7f29.

Cross-references throughout:

  • #691 — substrate rules engine v2 (base layer; L1-6 A–E shipped at HEAD 12a7f29).
  • #693 — v0.7.0 Policy Engine Completion (Option B parent meta).
  • #694 — PE-1 universal AgentAction wire-point coverage (merged at HEAD 12a7f29, commit cb6cca9).
  • #695 — PE-2 Claude Code PreToolUse harness hook installer (merged at HEAD 12a7f29, commit 5392162).
  • #696 — PE-3 deferred audit-log queue (merged at HEAD 12a7f29, commit 07b4957).
  • #697 — v0.8.0 100% Cryptographic Forensic Audit Trail closeout (epic).
  • positioning.md — category-level comparison of substrate-authority enforcement versus other agent-memory projects.

1. Goal

Operator directive, 2026-05-14, verbatim:

"Every tool call passes through a policy engine; the engine logs every refusal cryptographically; severity-classified rules can escalate to human."

The policy engine is the substrate component that implements that property. v0.7.0 Option B closes ~95% of it. The v0.8.0 epic (#697, eight sub-tasks V08-PE-1 … V08-PE-8) closes the remaining ~5% — read-action gating, subprocess-chain visibility, hard-crash durability of the audit queue, severity-based escalation, and a mechanical audit-trail completeness verifier.

The property has two enforcement modes — both shipped:

  1. Substrate-INTERNAL ops (memory_store, memory_link, memory_delete, memory_archive, memory_consolidate, memory_replay) are substrate-authoritative: every write path mechanically consults the engine before the SQL INSERT. The agent cannot bypass.
  2. Agent-EXTERNAL ops (Bash, FilesystemWrite outside the substrate, NetworkRequest, ProcessSpawn, Custom) are substrate-rule-bound, harness-mediated: the rule lives in the substrate's governance_rules table; the harness (Claude Code PreToolUse hook of type command — the enforcing wrapper ai-memory governance check-action --from-pretool-stdin, #1811; a type: mcp_tool hook cannot block, so the command wrapper is the load-bearing form) consults the substrate and honors the decision. Mechanical at the harness-hook boundary (operator-configured), not at the agent attention boundary (probabilistic).

2. Components

2.1 governance_rules table

SQLite migration migrations/sqlite/0024_v07_governance_rules.sql (schema row column kind, matcher, severity, reason, namespace, created_by, created_at, enabled, signature, attest_level). Seed rules R001 … R004 land at enabled = 0 per the cold-start contract — an upgrading operator never gets surprise refusals:

ID kind matcher severity reason
R001 filesystem_write {"glob":"/tmp/**"} refuse no /tmp writes
R002 filesystem_write {"glob":"/var/tmp/**"} refuse no /var/tmp writes
R003 filesystem_write {"glob":"/private/tmp/**"} refuse no /private/tmp writes (macOS realpath)
R004 process_spawn {"binary":"cargo","disk_free_min_gib":20} refuse cargo refused below 20 GiB free

Schema indexed by (kind, enabled) (idx_governance_rules_kind_enabled) so the dominant query — "list enabled rules of this kind" — is one index seek per check_agent_action invocation.

2.2 RulesStore — typed CRUD

src/governance/rules_store.rs. The only module allowed to read or write governance_rules directly. Verbs:

  • insert, get, list, list_enabled_by_kind (the load-time enforcement query — applies the L1-6 signature filter).
  • remove, set_enabled (mutators; CLI verifies operator signature before calling).
  • update_signature (persists Ed25519 signature + bumps attest_level to operator_signed).
  • canonical_bytes_for_signing — stable serialization commitment over {id, kind, matcher, severity, reason, namespace, created_by, enabled}. Includes enabled, intentionally omits created_at. See §4.2.

2.3 AgentAction enum + variants

src/governance/agent_action.rs::AgentAction. The agent-external action vocabulary the harness constructs from a proposed tool call:

Variant Wire kind Carrier fields
Bash bash command: String, optional cwd: PathBuf
FilesystemWrite filesystem_write path: PathBuf, optional byte_estimate: u64
NetworkRequest network_request host: String, scheme: String
ProcessSpawn process_spawn binary: String, args: Vec<String>
Custom custom custom_kind: String, payload: serde_json::Value

Variant names are the canonical kind strings in the governance_rules.kind column (lower_snake). Adding a new variant is wire-compatible — existing rules with unknown kinds are ignored, not failed. v0.8.0 (PE-2, #1730) shipped the AgentAction::Read variant (wire kind = read_action), wired into the recall / search / list / get / session_start read tools so reads route through the same rule engine + signed_events audit chain; the wire format was forward-compatible by construction. (Historically this was deferred to V08-PE-2 under #697.)

2.4 check_agent_action — audited path

src/governance/agent_action.rs::check_agent_action(conn, agent_id, action) -> Result<Decision>. The public entry point for the agent-external path. Behavior:

  1. list_enabled_by_kind(conn, action.kind()) — filtered through the L1-6 signature gate (§4.2).
  2. For each candidate rule, evaluate matcher_applies(rule, action).
  3. First-refusal wins. A refuse-severity match returns Decision::Refuse { rule_id, reason } and stops scanning.
  4. If no refuse fires, the first warn-severity match returns Decision::Warn { rule_id, reason }; otherwise Decision::Allow.
  5. Every exit emits one row to the signed_events chain with event_type = "governance.check" and payload_hash over the canonical {action, decision} JSON. This is the load-bearing audit chain for the v1.0 procurement review.

2.5 check_agent_action_no_audit — substrate pre-write hook path

src/governance/agent_action.rs::check_agent_action_no_audit(conn, action) -> Result<Decision>. L1-6 Deliverable E. Identical combinator, no signed_events emit. Two reasons:

  1. Re-entrancy. The hook fires INSIDE storage::insert — i.e. while the caller already holds the substrate writer's connection. A second append_signed_event on a sibling connection would race the WAL writer lock; on the same connection it would corrupt the in-flight INSERT's statement state.
  2. Symmetry. The substrate-internal write path is already audited at every callsite (handlers/http.rs and mcp/tools/store.rs both emit an AuditAction::Store row on success / a typed MemoryError on failure). A second emit here would amplify.

PE-3 (#696) adds a deferred audit-log queue so refusals on this path are still chain-logged — see §2.6.

2.6 check_agent_action_deferred — PE-3 deferred audit queue (shipped at HEAD 12a7f29, #696)

Status: MERGED at HEAD 12a7f29 (commit 07b4957). Issue #696 awaiting epic-level closure. Live code at src/governance/deferred_audit.rs (~1120 LoC). The function is the audit-emitting variant of check_agent_action_no_audit: the rule combinator runs synchronously inside the storage write path, but the signed_events row is enqueued onto a process-local channel and drained by a dedicated tokio task that opens its own connection — no re-entrancy on the substrate writer.

The deferred queue is process-local. A hard crash (SIGKILL, OOM, power loss) before drain loses pending refusal rows. V08-PE-4 (#697) closes that gap with a persistent on-disk queue (durable across daemon restart).

Five tests pin the property — see §4.

2.7 Operator keypair (~/.config/ai-memory/operator.key, mode 0600)

src/cli/rules.rs — verbs keygen, sign-seed, add --sign, enable --sign, disable --sign.

  • Private key: ~/.config/ai-memory/operator.key, mode 0600, Ed25519 32-byte seed (base64 URL-safe, no pad). Permissions checked at every load_operator_signing_key call; a world-readable file produces a hard refusal with a precise error message — see the keygen_writes_0600_and_load_refuses_open_permissions test.
  • Public key: ~/.config/ai-memory/operator.key.pub (default, resolved via dirs::config_dir()) or the AI_MEMORY_OPERATOR_PUBKEY env var (base64 of the 32-byte verifying key). Either resolves a VerifyingKey; the env var wins when both are present.

2.8 Load-time signature verification (L1-6)

src/governance/rules_store.rs::enforced_rule_passes. The activation cliff is operator pubkey presence:

  • Pubkey NOT resolved (cold start, fresh install, test environment): every enabled = 1 row passes through unchanged. The pre-L1-6 contract is preserved.
  • Pubkey resolved + row attest_level = 'operator_signed' + signature verifies: rule is enforced.
  • Pubkey resolved + row attest_level = 'operator_signed' but signature does NOT verify (tampered row, post-sign direct SQL mutation, wrong key): tracing::error! and SKIP. The daemon does NOT crash. A tampered rule must never bring down the substrate.
  • Pubkey resolved + row attest_level = 'unsigned': tracing::warn! and SKIP — enforced rules MUST be operator-signed once L1-6 is active.

The signature commits to canonical_bytes_for_signing over the rule's content fields plus enabled. That last detail is the central bypass-prevention property — see §4.2.

3. Wire-points

3.1 Shipped at HEAD c359e89

Surface Call site AgentAction constructed Refusal mapping
Substrate write path (HTTP POST /api/v1/memories, MCP memory_store, federation inbound, CLI ai-memory mine) src/storage/mod.rs::consult_governance_pre_write (OnceLock-installed closure in src/daemon_runtime.rs::install_governance_pre_write_hook, installed by both daemon serve AND ai-memory mcp since #1583; CLI one-shot ops do NOT install it by design) AgentAction::Custom { custom_kind: "memory_write", payload: {namespace, tier, memory_kind, title} } evaluated by check_agent_action_no_audit HTTP 403 FORBIDDEN + GOVERNANCE_REFUSED code; MCP GOVERNANCE_REFUSED error data; typed MemoryError::RefusedByGovernance
MCP memory_check_agent_action (Power family) src/mcp/tools/check_agent_action.rs::handle_check_agent_action → check_agent_action (audited) Caller-supplied — {kind, ...} per §2.3 MCP tool returns {"decision":"refuse", "rule_id": "...", "reason": "..."} for programmatic callers; the BLOCKING Claude Code PreToolUse hook is a type: command wrapper (ai-memory governance check-action --from-pretool-stdin, #1811) — a type: mcp_tool hook cannot block
CLI ai-memory rules check src/cli/rules.rs::run (RulesAction::Check variant) → check_agent_action (audited) Caller-supplied via --kind + --command/--path/--host/--binary Non-zero exit code on refuse; JSON output via --json

All three production wire-points share the same combinator and the same governance_rules table. The audit emit differs only between the substrate-internal pre-write path (deferred via PE-3 once merged) and the agent-external paths (audited synchronously today).

3.2 In-flight at v0.7.0 Option B (historical — all three shipped by HEAD 12a7f29)

Wire-point Issue Status at c359e89 Status at 12a7f29 (fold-J audit)
PE-1: universal AgentAction wire-point coverage — extends the construction surface so every harness-visible tool maps to an AgentAction variant #694 Branch policy-engine/wire-points, not merged MERGED (commit cb6cca9); GOVERNANCE_PRE_ACTION installed in src/daemon_runtime.rs:2050; covers MCP skill_export, federation::sync, hooks::executor, and the LLM client
PE-2: Claude Code PreToolUse harness hook installer — ai-memory install --harness claude-code --enforce-policy configures the hook so the harness consults memory_check_agent_action before every Bash / Write / NetworkRequest / Process spawn #695 Branch policy-engine/harness-hook, not merged MERGED (commit 5392162); installer wires PreToolUse hook into harness settings.json
PE-3: deferred audit-log queue — adds check_agent_action_deferred for the substrate pre-write hook so storage refusals are chain-logged #696 Branch policy-engine/deferred-audit-log, not merged MERGED (commit 07b4957); install_deferred_audit_drainer wired in src/daemon_runtime.rs:1946; process-local tokio drain writes governance.refusal rows to signed_events

This document is the v0.7.0 single source of truth for these boundaries. The fold-J audit pass (2026-05-14, HEAD 12a7f29) recorded the merge state of PE-1 / PE-2 / PE-3 in the "Status at 12a7f29" column above. The substrate behavior described in §3.1 and the audit-trail coverage matrix in §8 / docs/security/audit-trail-coverage.md reflect this terminal v0.7.0 ship state.

4. Bypass-impossibility properties

All properties below are pinned by integration tests at HEAD c359e89 and by the PE-3 deferred-audit-log test suite once it merges.

4.1 Six L1-6 integration tests

File: tests/governance_l16_activation.rs. Tests:

  1. enforced_rule_must_be_operator_signed — pubkey present + row enabled = 1 but attest_level = 'unsigned' ⇒ rule is filtered at load (tracing::warn!); a /tmp/foo write is Decision::Allow because no enforced rule fires. Operator misconfiguration is observable, never silently permissive.
  2. tampered_signature_rejects_at_load — pubkey present, row attest_level = 'operator_signed' but the stored signature is corrupted ⇒ filtered at load (tracing::error!); the rule does not fire. Plain language: an attacker who flips one bit in a signed row gets the same outcome as an attacker who never signed it — silent skip with an audit-visible log line.
  3. direct_enabled_flip_bypass_attempt_fails — a signed enabled = 0 row is mutated via direct SQL (UPDATE governance_rules SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = ?). Because canonical_bytes_for_signing commits to enabled, the recorded signature no longer verifies the new canonical bytes. The rule is skipped at load. Plain language: you cannot turn a signed rule on or off via direct database edits — the operator must re-sign.
  4. keygen_writes_0600_and_load_refuses_open_permissions — the private key file is required to be mode 0600; a world-readable key produces a refusal at load time, not at first-use. Plain language: a leaked private key cannot be quietly used.
  5. sign_seed_idempotent — ai-memory rules sign-seed produces stable canonical bytes across repeat invocations even when the migration re-runs with created_at resets. Plain language: the operator can re-sign the seed without invalidating prior signatures.
  6. rotated_operator_key_invalidates_prior_signatures — rotating the operator key invalidates every prior signature. The tampered-row branch fires for every previously-signed row until the operator re-signs under the new key. Plain language: key rotation is a hard reset of the enforced rule set.

4.2 Storage::insert hook unbypassability

File: tests/governance_storage_insert_hook.rs. Six tests:

  1. hook_set_to_allow_lets_write_through — the allow leg is zero-cost: no signed_events write, no extra connection, no blocking SQL.
  2. hook_set_to_refuse_returns_typed_error — refusal at the pre-write hook surfaces as MemoryError::RefusedByGovernance, not a generic anyhow chain. HTTP maps to 403 GOVERNANCE_REFUSED.
  3. hook_refusal_propagates_via_anyhow_downcast — the anyhow chain carries a typed marker (storage::GovernanceRefusal) that downcasts cleanly in MemoryError::from(anyhow::Error).
  4. hook_gates_all_three_insert_paths — insert, insert_with_conflict, and insert_if_newer all consult the hook. Plain language: there is no "side door" insert path that skips the policy engine.
  5. cli_one_shot_does_not_install_hook — ai-memory store / mine / import (one-shot CLI ops) leave the OnceLock empty by design — the operator's direct substrate ops stay unimpeded. The long-lived write surfaces — ai-memory serve (HTTP daemon) AND ai-memory mcp (stdio agent interface) — both install the hook via the shared install_governance_pre_write_hook helper (#1583); mcp_store_is_refused_by_agent_action_rule_1583 pins the MCP path. CLI one-shot stays intentionally outside it.
  6. refusal_maps_to_http_403 — the daemon end-to-end: an HTTP POST /api/v1/memories against an enforced refuse-rule returns 403 with body {"code":"GOVERNANCE_REFUSED","reason": "..."}.

The hook itself is a process-wide OnceLock<Box<dyn Fn>> in src/storage/mod.rs::GOVERNANCE_PRE_WRITE. Plain language: installation is one-shot at the type level — no reset, no override, no test-only escape hatch reachable from production. The hook closure is consulted by every substrate write path; it cannot be worked around without modifying the substrate source.

4.3 PE-3 deferred-audit-log tests (merged at HEAD 12a7f29, #696)

Five tests landed on feat/v0.7.0-grand-slam via commit 07b4957 under issue #696, plus the V-4 deferred-audit soak test (tests/deferred_audit_soak.rs, commit 9ebc9e0) asserting the V-4 cross-row hash chain holds after 5K concurrent inserts through the drainer:

  1. Deferred refusal eventually emits governance.check row with identical canonical-bytes / payload_hash as the audited path.
  2. Drain is bounded — under flood the queue cap is honored and the governance.check_drop counter increments rather than the daemon blocking the write path.
  3. Drain-on-shutdown — the daemon's graceful shutdown drains the queue before exit; clean stop is loss-free.
  4. Crash before drain loses pending rows. Documented gap. Closed by V08-PE-4 (#697) with a persistent on-disk queue.
  5. Cross-reference: an end-to-end test feeds a tampered signature through the hook → refusal verdict matches → audit row matches → chain verify passes. Plain language: a refusal at the substrate-internal pre-write hook ends up cryptographically chain-logged via the same signed_events table the agent-external path uses today.

PE-3 merged at HEAD 12a7f29 (commit 07b4957); the §3.2 row has been migrated to §3.1 above with the merge-state column added, and the audit-trail coverage matrix in docs/security/audit-trail-coverage.md has been updated by the fold-J audit pass (2026-05-14) to flip the "deferred chain-log" row from in-flight to shipped.

5. What v0.7.0 substrate authority IS

Substrate-visible action coverage at HEAD c359e89:

  • Memory writes — every storage::insert* path (HTTP, MCP, federation, queue replay) consults GOVERNANCE_PRE_WRITE and refuses cleanly on a refuse-severity match.
  • Network requests via the daemon — the daemon's outbound federation paths and webhook delivery are governance-bounded by the same engine when an AgentAction::NetworkRequest rule is in scope; full PE-1 coverage of NetworkRequest wire-points lands with #694.
  • Process spawns initiated by the substrate — the seed rule R004 demonstrates the contract (cargo refused on low-disk systems). PE-1 widens substrate-initiated spawns to consult the engine universally; #694.
  • Optional harness hook for PreToolUse — when the operator installs the Claude Code PreToolUse hook via PE-2 (#695), the harness consults memory_check_agent_action before every Bash / Write / NetworkRequest / ProcessSpawn the agent proposes. The harness boundary is operator-configured; the substrate rules themselves are operator-signed.

6. What v0.7.0 substrate authority ISN'T

Cold honesty. These boundaries are out of scope at HEAD c359e89 and closed by v0.8.0 (#697, V08-PE-1 … V08-PE-8):

  • Out-of-band channels. The substrate cannot gate actions that bypass the harness — an agent that reaches for tokio::process in its own out-of-substrate code is not bound by the engine. Bounded by the harness boundary, not the substrate. Unenforceable by definition. The mitigation is mandatory-hook profile (V08-PE-1, procurement-tier --enforce) and TPM-bound binary integrity (V08-PE-6) — the operator runs an attested binary that refuses to serve when the hook is uninstalled. The hook-PRESENCE half of V08-PE-1 shipped at v0.8.0 (#1734): AI_MEMORY_HOOKS_ENFORCE_MODE (off/advisory/enforce, default off) paired with [hooks].required_events returns Deny { code: 503 } when a required pre-* event has no enabled hook.
  • Read-action gating. No AgentAction::Read variant shipped at the v0.7.0 HEAD c359e89. Recall / search / list / get were gated only through the K9 Permissions::evaluate pipeline (memory-scoped), with no top-level "an agent is reading X" surface. Closed at v0.8.0 (PE-2, #1730): the AgentAction::Read variant (wire read_action) now routes recall / search / list / get / session_start through the rule engine + audit chain.
  • Subprocess chains. A Bash rule fires against the literal argv the harness proposes. A bash -c "evil_thing" invocation whose evil_thing then fork()s an unrelated child is invisible to the engine — the child is born inside the kernel without another harness round-trip. V08-PE-3 (#697) adds eBPF on Linux
    • dtrace on macOS to surface the chain.
  • Binary integrity attestation. The engine does not verify the shipping binary against an attested manifest. An attacker with FS write access could replace ai-memory with a forked build that no-ops the hook. V08-PE-6 (#697) closes this with TPM-bound attestation.
  • Severity-based human escalation. At the v0.7.0 HEAD the engine had three verdict shapes — Allow, Refuse, Warn — with no Escalate shape. Shipped at v0.8.0 (#1727 / §22 PE-5, schema v66): governance_rules.severity now accepts escalate, which produces Decision::Escalate — a verdict that fails closed (blocks the action exactly like Refuse, via Decision::is_block) pending human review. The operator dashboard + interactive approval queue that resolve an escalation remain V08-PE-5 (#697) scope.
  • Hard-crash drainer loss. PE-3's deferred queue is process-local. A SIGKILL between the refuse verdict and the drainer's append loses the audit row. V08-PE-4 (#697) makes the queue persistent across daemon restart.

Tracking: #697 holds the v0.8.0 epic. The audit-trail coverage matrix at security/audit-trail-coverage.md enumerates the same gaps from the audit-chain perspective.

7. Operator workflow

End-to-end activation of L1-6 enforcement, no theater:

# 1. Generate the operator keypair (mode 0600 enforced).
ai-memory rules keygen
# → writes ~/.config/ai-memory/operator.key (private, 0600)
# → writes ~/.config/ai-memory/operator.key.pub (public, 0644)

# 2. Sign the seed rules R001-R004 with the operator key.
ai-memory rules sign-seed
# → updates governance_rules.signature for each seed row
# → bumps attest_level from 'unsigned' to 'operator_signed'
# → idempotent: re-running produces identical signatures (canonical
#   bytes omit created_at on purpose)

# 3. Activate one rule. `--sign` is required — the CLI verifies the
#    operator key is loadable before flipping `enabled`.
ai-memory rules enable R001 --sign

# 4. (Optional) Install the harness hook so Claude Code consults the
#    substrate on every PreToolUse. PE-2 (#695) shipped; at v0.8.0 the
#    installed hook is the enforcing `type: command` wrapper (#1811).
ai-memory install claude-code --hook pretool --apply

# 5. Verify with a smoke test. The check verb runs the audited path so
#    every check shows up in signed_events.
ai-memory rules check \
  --agent-id alice \
  --kind filesystem_write \
  --path /tmp/anything
# → exit 1, prints {"decision":"refuse","rule_id":"R001",
#                   "reason":"Operator hard rule (#691): no /tmp writes..."}

# 6. Confirm the audit chain captured the refusal.
ai-memory verify-reflection-chain  # or: ai-memory audit verify

The activation cliff is step 2. Before that, the substrate is in pre-L1-6 mode and every enabled row passes through unchanged. After step 2 + step 3, only operator-signed rows are enforced — every other row is warn!-logged and skipped.

8. Audit-trail completeness coverage matrix

Action class Wire-point Coverage at c359e89 Gap closed by
Substrate-INTERNAL writes (memory_store, memory_link, memory_delete, memory_archive, memory_consolidate) storage::insert* + handler-emitted AuditAction::Store etc. 100% audited (handler emits success row; refusal emits a deferred row once PE-3 merges) PE-3 (#696) for the refusal leg
Substrate-INTERNAL reads (memory_recall, memory_search, memory_list, memory_get, memory_session_boot) AuditAction::Recall etc. in handler layer 100% audited at handler layer for visibility. Engine-level read gating shipped at v0.8.0 (PE-2, #1730) — AgentAction::Read (wire read_action) routes these surfaces through the rule engine. V08-PE-2 (#697) shipped #1730
memory_replay (transcript cross-tenant read) K9 Op::MemoryReplay gates the read; audit row on every call 100% audited —
Agent-EXTERNAL Bash memory_check_agent_action MCP tool consulted by harness PreToolUse Audited every call via check_agent_action audited path. Harness coverage is operator-configured (PE-2 / #695) PE-2 (#695) merges harness installer
Agent-EXTERNAL FilesystemWrite outside substrate as above as above as above
Agent-EXTERNAL NetworkRequest as above as above as above
Agent-EXTERNAL ProcessSpawn as above as above (universal PE-1 coverage tracked at #694) PE-1 (#694)
Subprocess chains (bash spawn → fork → exec) not visible at HEAD out of scope V08-PE-3 (#697)
Out-of-band agent actions not visible by definition unenforceable partial: V08-PE-1 mandatory-hook + V08-PE-6 TPM (#697)
Hard-crash recovery of deferred queue n/a until PE-3 merges; then process-local gap V08-PE-4 (#697)
Severity-based escalation (Escalate verdict) governance.check audit row on every escalate decision (fail-closed, blocks like refuse) absent at v0.7.0 HEAD; verdict + escalate severity shipped at v0.8.0 (#1727 / schema v66) interactive dashboard/queue resolution remains V08-PE-5 (#697)

The same matrix from the audit-chain side, with row shapes and verification examples, lives in security/audit-trail-coverage.md.

9. Forward roadmap

The v0.8.0 closeout epic (#697) holds eight sub-tasks. Each closes one observable gap from §6 / §8:

  • V08-PE-1 — Mandatory-hook profile. Hook-PRESENCE enforcement shipped at v0.8.0 (#1734): AI_MEMORY_HOOKS_ENFORCE_MODE (off/advisory/enforce, default off) paired with [hooks].required_events returns Deny { code: 503 } when a required pre-* event has no enabled hook (and forces those hooks to effective fail_mode = Closed). The procurement-tier refuse-to-serve-without-the-PreToolUse-hook attestation remains open.
  • V08-PE-2 — Read-action gating (AgentAction::Read variant + wire-point coverage for the read surface).
  • V08-PE-3 — Subprocess-chain visibility (eBPF on Linux, dtrace on macOS; surfaces the fork+exec chain to the engine).
  • V08-PE-4 — Persistent audit queue (durable across daemon restart; closes the hard-crash gap in PE-3's process-local queue).
  • V08-PE-5 — Severity-based human escalation. The Decision::Escalate verdict + the escalate severity (schema v66) shipped at v0.8.0 (#1727), failing closed pending review; the operator dashboard + interactive approval queue remain open here.
  • V08-PE-6 — TPM-bound binary integrity (the daemon attests the shipping binary against a signed manifest at boot).
  • V08-PE-7 — Refuse-by-default profile (procurement-tier rule set that ships enabled = 1, attest_level = operator_signed out of the box — opt-out rather than opt-in).
  • V08-PE-8 — Audit-trail completeness verifier (ai-memory verify-audit-trail walks the signed_events chain end-to-end and cross-references against the expected event surface; closes the verification loop).

Effort: 22–28 sessions · 3–4 weeks wall-clock · MEDIUM-HIGH risk. Tracking: #697 with sub-tasks V08-PE-1 … V08-PE-8.

Document classification: Public-facing OSS architecture documentation. v0.7.0 Option B single source of truth for the policy engine. Updated at every §16-style integration gate.