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# Event Studies {#sec-event-studies}
The event study methodology is widely used in finance, marketing, and management to measure the impact of specific events on stock prices. The foundation of this methodology is the **Efficient Markets Hypothesis** proposed by @fama1970efficient, which asserts that asset prices reflect all available information. Under this assumption, stock prices should immediately react to new, unexpected information, making [event studies](#sec-event-studies) a useful tool for assessing the economic impact of firm- and non-firm-initiated activities.
::: {.rmdnote}
A note on descriptive vs. causal interpretation. In its classical finance form, an event study produces a series of *abnormal returns*: deviations of observed returns from the return predicted by a market (or factor) model. Abnormal returns are a descriptive object. They tell us how prices moved relative to a statistical benchmark around the event window.
Interpreting them as a causal effect of the event on firm value requires additional design-level assumptions:
1. The event date is known precisely and was not anticipated. Otherwise the market has priced it in before the window opens.
2. No other news or events overlap the event window, so that the price movement is attributable to the focal event and not a confounder.
3. The expected-return model is correctly specified during the estimation window.
When these conditions are not met, the event study documents a correlation between a period and a price movement, not a causal effect. In modern empirical practice, event studies are often layered on top of an explicit quasi-experimental design ([DiD](#sec-difference-in-differences), [RD](#sec-regression-discontinuity), or [IV](#sec-instrumental-variables)): the event-study plot then serves as a *visualization* of dynamic treatment effects, and the causal identification comes from the underlying design rather than from the event study itself.
:::
The first event study was conducted by @dolley1933characteristics, while @campbell1998econometrics formalized the methodology for modern applications. Later, @dubow2006measuring developed a metric to assess market transparency (i.e., a way to gauge how "clean" a market is) by tracking unusual stock price movements before major regulatory announcements. Their study found that abnormal price shifts before announcements could indicate insider trading, as prices reacted to leaked information before official disclosures.
**Advantages of [Event Studies](#sec-event-studies)**
- **More Reliable than Accounting-Based Measures:** Unlike financial metrics (e.g., profits), which managers can manipulate, stock prices are harder to alter and reflect real-time investor sentiment [@benston1985validity].
- **Easy to Conduct:** Event studies require only stock price data and simple econometric models, making them widely accessible for researchers.
**Types of Events in Event Studies**
Table \@ref(tab:event-study-event-types) groups the events typically analysed by event studies into firm-internal and firm-external categories.
| **Event Type** | **Examples** |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Internal Events** | Stock repurchase, earnings announcements, leadership changes |
| **External Events** | Macroeconomic shocks, regulatory changes, media reports |
Table: (\#tab:event-study-event-types) Internal versus external event categories analysed in event studies, with representative examples.
## A Brief Tour of How the Method Travelled
It is worth pausing on how the event study became a workhorse in three quite different fields, because the migration from finance into management and then marketing tells you something about what the method actually buys you and what it cannot.
The technique was born in finance. @fama1969adjustment used the announcement of stock splits to ask a deceptively simple question: do prices adjust to new information immediately, or does adjustment take place over days or weeks? The answer mattered for the efficient-markets hypothesis, but the *machinery*, pick an event, define a window, compute a normal return, attribute the gap to the event, was general. Once the machinery existed, every field with a clean event and a market response found a use for it.
Management researchers were the next adopters. By the late 1990s the question had shifted from market efficiency to managerial decision-making: do the choices managers make actually create shareholder value, and which ones? @mcwilliams1997event surveyed how the method had been imported into management research and laid out the methodological cautions, short windows, careful event definition, attention to confounding events, that have shaped practice ever since. Their review remains the standard starting point for anyone applying event studies outside finance.
Marketing scholars adopted the same machinery to defend marketing decisions in the language that boards and CFOs already spoke: stock price. If a brand acquisition, a celebrity endorsement, or a new product launch is supposed to create value, the event study lets us check whether the market thought so on the day the news broke. Two strands of marketing event studies emerged. The first asks about *firm-initiated* events: things the firm chose to do. The second asks about *non-firm-initiated* events: things that happened to the firm, often outside its control.
Tables \@ref(tab:event-study-firm-initiated) and \@ref(tab:event-study-non-firm) collect representative work in each strand, organised by event type so that the table doubles as a reading list for a particular research question. The point is not to memorise these citations but to see the breadth of what an event study can address, from corporate name changes to data breaches, once you accept that "value created" is being proxied by "market reaction".
| **Event Type** | **Studies** |
|--------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Corporate Changes** | [@horsky1987does] (name change), [@kalaignanam2013corporate] (corporate brand change) |
| **New Product Strategies** | [@chaney1991impact] (new product announcements), [@raassens2012market] (outsourcing product development), [@sood2009innovations] (innovation payoff), [@borah2014make] (make, buy or ally for innovations), [@fang2015timing] (co-development agreements) |
| **Brand & Marketing Strategies** | [@lane1995stock] (brand extensions), [@wiles2012effect] (brand acquisition) |
| **Advertising & Promotions** | [@wiles2010stock] (deceptive advertising), [@cornwell2005relationship] (sponsorship announcements) |
| **Strategic Alliances** | [@houston2000buyer] (joint ventures), [@fang2015timing] (co-development agreements), [@sorescu2007some] (M&A), [@homburg2014firm] (channel expansions) |
| **Entertainment & Celebrity Endorsements** | [@agrawal1995economic] (celebrity endorsements), [@elberse2007power] (casting announcements), [@wiles2009worth] (product placement in movies), [@joshi2009movie] (movie releases), [@karniouchina2011marketing] (product placement), [@mazodier2013sponsorship] (sports annoucements) |
Table: (\#tab:event-study-firm-initiated) Marketing event studies of firm-initiated activities, grouped by event category.
Two further marketing studies sit slightly outside that grid but illustrate the same logic: @geyskens2002market examined newspapers' decisions to launch internet channels, and @boyd2010chief looked at the market's reaction to new CMO appointments. Both treat a strategic choice as the event and ask whether shareholders rewarded or punished it.
The non-firm-initiated literature is structurally similar but methodologically more demanding. Because the firm did not choose the event, the researcher has fewer levers to manipulate: there is no internal documentation of the announcement timing, leakage is harder to rule out, and selection into "events that journalists write about" is itself a research question. The studies in Table \@ref(tab:event-study-non-firm) tackle this in different ways, some focus on regulator-announced events with a clean publication date, others on negative shocks where the firm's response is partly endogenous to the event itself.
| **Event Type** | **Studies** |
|-----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Regulatory Decisions** | [@sorescu2003] (FDA approvals), [@rao2008fruits] (FDA approvals), [@tipton2009regulatory] (deceptive advertising regulation) |
| **Media Coverage & Consumer Reactions** | [@jacobson2009financial] (customer satisfaction score release), [@chen2012third] (third-party movie reviews), [@tellis2007] (quality reviews by Walter Mossberg) |
| **Economic & Market Shocks** | [@gielens2008dancing] (Walmart's entry into the UK), [@xiong2013asymmetric] (asymmetric news impact), [@pandey2005relationship] (diversity elite list) |
| **Consumer & Industry Recognitions** | [@balasubramanian2005impact] (high-quality achievements), [@fornell2006customer] (customer satisfaction), [@ittner2009commentary] (customer satisfaction) |
| **Financial & Market Reactions** | [@boyd2008market] (indirect ties), [@karniouchina2009impact] (*Mad Money* with Jim Cramer), [@bhagat1998shareholder] (litigation) |
| **Product & Service Failures** | [@chen2009does] (product recalls), [@gao2015should] (product recalls), [@malhotra2011evaluating] (data breach) |
Table: (\#tab:event-study-non-firm) Marketing event studies of non-firm-initiated activities, grouped by external event category.
The space of plausible event studies is far from exhausted. Major advertising campaigns, market entries, product recalls, and patent announcements are all candidate events whose informational content arrives with a clean timestamp and whose effect on firm value is in principle measurable. Whenever you encounter a setting where (a) the event is dated precisely, (b) market participants could plausibly update on it, and (c) you can construct a defensible counterfactual from the estimation window, the apparatus that follows in this chapter is in scope.
## Key Assumptions
The interpretation of an event study, whether descriptive or causal, rests on a small set of assumptions about how prices, information, and the firm's stakeholders interact. None of these are testable in the strong sense that randomization is, and each fails in identifiable ways. Reading the four assumptions below as licensing claims, each one buying you a specific interpretation, is more useful than reading them as a checklist.
The **Efficient Market Hypothesis** [@fama1970efficient] is the load-bearing assumption. It says that stock prices fully and instantly reflect publicly available information, so a measurable price reaction in the days surrounding an event is interpretable as the market's revaluation of the firm in light of the event's news content. When EMH holds in its strong form, the event window is exactly where the news shows up; when it holds only weakly (information leaks before the announcement, prices drift in the days after), the analyst must widen the window or accept that the estimated abnormal return is contaminated. EMH is not all-or-nothing in practice, and most modern event studies assume a semi-strong form (prices reflect public information) rather than a strong form (prices reflect all information including private signals).
The **stock market as a proxy for firm value** assumption says that the price of equity is a meaningful summary of the firm's value to its primary stakeholders. This is uncontroversial in finance applications where shareholders are the relevant audience. It is more contested in marketing or management applications, where the relevant audience is sometimes customers, employees, or regulators, and where firm value to those stakeholders is not perfectly tracked by share prices. The closer the research question is to "what did this event do to shareholder wealth?", the better this assumption holds; the further it is from that question, the more the analyst should report alternative outcome measures alongside abnormal returns.
The **sharp event-effect assumption** requires that the event causes an immediate and concentrated price reaction. If the market reacts gradually over several months, no plausible event window will isolate the effect; if the market anticipates the event, the price has already moved before the window opens. The assumption is most credible for events with precise timestamps that the market could not have anticipated (regulatory rulings on a fixed announcement date, court verdicts, corporate disclosures with mandated reporting calendars). It is least credible for events whose probability of occurrence was already partially priced in, in which case the abnormal return measures the surprise component, not the full effect of the event.
The **proper calculation of expected returns** is what gives the abnormal return a benchmark. The mechanics matter: a market model with the wrong factor specification, an estimation window that includes a structural break, or a beta estimated on a thin sample will all produce expected returns that misstate the counterfactual price path. The downstream consequence is that the abnormal return is only as clean as the expected-return model. We return to this point in the [expected return calculation section](#sec-expected-return-calculation) and the [econometric event-study designs section](#sec-econometric-event-study-designs).
These four assumptions together support a *descriptive* claim, that the abnormal return measures the price reaction to the event window. Promoting that descriptive claim to a *causal* claim, that the event itself caused the price reaction, requires the additional design-level assumptions discussed at the start of this chapter: no contemporaneous confounding events, no anticipation, and a benchmark model that is correctly specified throughout the estimation window. Modern empirical practice typically pairs the event-study machinery with an explicit quasi-experimental design ([Regression Discontinuity](#sec-regression-discontinuity), [examiner IV](#sec-examiner-design), or [Difference-in-Differences](#sec-difference-in-differences)) so that the causal claim does not rest on the four assumptions above alone.
## Steps for Conducting an Event Study
### Step 1: Event Identification
An event study examines how a particular event affects a firm's stock price, assuming that stock markets incorporate new information efficiently. The event must influence either the firm's expected cash flows or discount rate [@sorescu2017, p. 191].
**Common Types of Events Analyzed**
Table \@ref(tab:event-study-event-categories) lists the broad event categories most often analysed and gives concrete examples of each.
| **Event Category** | **Examples** |
|------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Corporate Actions** | Dividends, mergers & acquisitions (M&A), stock buybacks, name changes, brand extensions, sponsorships, product launches, advertising campaigns |
| **Regulatory Changes** | New laws, taxation policies, financial deregulation, trade agreements |
| **Market Events** | Privatization, nationalization, entry/exit from major indices |
| **Marketing-Related Events** | Celebrity endorsements, new product announcements, media reviews |
| **Crisis & Negative Shocks** | Product recalls, data breaches, lawsuits, financial fraud scandals |
Table: (\#tab:event-study-event-categories) Broad categories of events analysed in event studies and representative examples of each.
To systematically identify events, researchers use **WRDS S&P Capital IQ Key Developments**, which tracks U.S. and international corporate events.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Step 2: Define the Event and Estimation Windows
#### (A) Estimation Window ($T_0 \to T_1$)
The estimation window is used to compute normal (expected) returns before the event. Table \@ref(tab:event-study-estimation-window) summarises common choices in the literature.
| **Study** | **Estimation Window** |
|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [@johnston2007review] | 250 days before the event, with a 45-day gap before the event window |
| [@wiles2012effect] | 90-trading-day estimation window ending 6 days before the event |
| [@sorescu2017, p. 194] | 100 days before the event |
Table: (\#tab:event-study-estimation-window) Estimation-window choices used in representative event-study papers.
> **Leakage Concern**: To avoid biases from information leaking before the event, researchers should check broad news sources (e.g., LexisNexis, Factiva, RavenPack) for pre-event rumors.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
#### (B) Event Window ($T_1 \to T_2$)
The event window captures the market's reaction to the event. The selection of an appropriate window length depends on event type and information speed; Table \@ref(tab:event-study-event-window) reports choices used in the literature.
| **Study** | **Event Window** |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| [@balasubramanian2005impact; @boyd2010chief; @fornell2006customer] | **1-day window** |
| [@raassens2012market; @sood2009innovations] | **2-day window** |
| [@cornwell2005relationship; @sorescu2007some] | **Up to 10 days** |
Table: (\#tab:event-study-event-window) Event-window lengths used in representative event-study papers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
#### (C) Post-Event Window ($T_2 \to T_3$)
Used to assess long-term effects on stock prices.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Step 3: Compute Normal vs. Abnormal Returns
The abnormal return measures how much the stock price deviates from its expected return:
$$
\text{AR}_{it} = R_{it} - E(R_{it} \mid X_t)
$$
where:
- $\text{AR}_{it}$ = abnormal return for firm $i$ at time $t$
- $R_{it}$ = realized (dividend-adjusted) return
- $E(R_{it} \mid X_t)$ = expected return given the conditioning information $X_t$ (typically the market or factor returns over the estimation window)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
#### (A) Statistical Models for Expected Returns
These models assume jointly normal and independently distributed returns.
1. **Constant Mean Return Model**\
$$ E(R_{it}) = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=T_0}^{T_1} R_{it} $$
2. **Market Model**\
$$ R_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i R_{mt} + \epsilon_{it} $$
3. **Adjusted Market Return Model**\
$$ E(R_{it}) = R_{mt} $$
------------------------------------------------------------------------
#### (B) Economic Models for Expected Returns
1. **Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)**\
$$ E(R_{it}) = R_f + \beta (R_m - R_f) $$
2. **Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT)**\
$$ R_{it} = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 F_1 + \lambda_2 F_2 + ... + \lambda_n F_n + \epsilon_{it} $$
------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Step 4: Compute Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Once abnormal returns are computed, we aggregate them over the event window:
$$
CAR_{i} = \sum_{t=T_{\text{event, start}}}^{T_{\text{event, end}}} AR_{it}
$$
For multiple firms, compute the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (ACAR):
$$
ACAR = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} CAR_{i}
$$
------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Step 5: Statistical Tests for Significance
To determine if abnormal returns are statistically significant, use:
1. T-Test for Abnormal Returns $$ t = \frac{\bar{CAR}}{\sigma(CAR)} $$
2. Bootstrap & Monte Carlo Simulations
- Used when returns are non-normally distributed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
## Event Studies in Marketing
A key challenge in marketing-related event studies is determining the appropriate dependent variable [@skiera2017should]. Traditional event studies in finance use cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) on shareholder value ($CAR^{SHV}$). However, marketing events primarily affect a firm's operating business, rather than its total shareholder value, leading to potential distortions if financial leverage is ignored.
According to valuation theory, a firm's shareholder value ($SHV$) consists of three components [@schulze2012linking]:
$$
SHV = \text{Operating Business Value} + \text{Non-Operating Assets} - \text{Debt}
$$
Many marketing-related events primarily impact operating business value (e.g., brand perception, customer satisfaction, advertising efficiency), while non-operating assets and debt remain largely unaffected.
Ignoring firm-specific leverage effects in event studies can cause:
- Inflated impact for firms with high debt.
- Deflated impact for firms with large non-operating assets.
Thus, it is recommended that both $CAR^{OB}$ and $CAR^{SHV}$ be reported, with justification for which is most appropriate.
Surprisingly few event studies have explicitly controlled for financial structure. Two exceptions are worth flagging because they show how the correction can be operationalised. @chaney1991impact look at the relationship between advertising expenses and firm value while explicitly holding leverage in the picture, and @gielens2008dancing extend the same logic to marketing-spending shocks. Outside this small literature, the implicit assumption is that leverage is uncorrelated with the event of interest, which is rarely defended and often demonstrably false.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Definition
1. **Cumulative Abnormal Return on Shareholder Value** ($CAR^{SHV}$)
$$
CAR^{SHV} = \frac{\sum \text{Abnormal Returns}}{SHV}
$$
- Shareholder Value ($SHV$): Market capitalization, defined as:
$$
SHV = \text{Share Price} \times \text{Shares Outstanding}
$$
2. **Cumulative Abnormal Return on Operating Business** ($CAR^{OB}$)
To correct for leverage effects, $CAR^{OB}$ is calculated as:
$$
CAR^{OB} = \frac{CAR^{SHV}}{\text{Leverage Effect}}
$$
where:
$$
\text{Leverage Effect} = \frac{\text{Operating Business Value}}{\text{Shareholder Value}}
$$
Key Relationships:
- Operating Business Value = $SHV -$ Non-Operating Assets $+$ Debt.
- Leverage Effect ($LE$) measures how a 1% change in operating business value translates into shareholder value movement.
3. **Leverage Effect vs. Leverage Ratio**
Leverage Effect ($LE$) is not the same as the leverage ratio, which is typically:
$$
\text{Leverage Ratio} = \frac{\text{Debt}}{\text{Firm Size}}
$$
where firm size can be:
- Book value of equity
- Market capitalization
- Total assets
- Debt + Equity
------------------------------------------------------------------------
### When Can Marketing Events Affect Non-Operating Assets or Debt?
While most marketing events impact operating business value, in rare cases they also influence non-operating assets and debt (Table \@ref(tab:event-study-financial-structure)).
| Marketing Event | Impact on Financial Structure |
|-------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Excess Pre-ordering [@hall2004determinants] | Affects short-term debt |
| CMO Turnover [@berger1997managerial] | Higher debt due to manager turnover |
| Unique Product Development [@bhaduri2002determinants] | Alters debt levels |
Table: (\#tab:event-study-financial-structure) Marketing events that can affect a firm's non-operating assets or debt rather than operating value.
These exceptions highlight why controlling for financial structure is crucial in event studies.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Calculating the Leverage Effect
We can express leverage effect ($LE$) as:
$$
\begin{aligned}
LE &= \frac{\text{Operating Business Value}}{\text{Shareholder Value}} \\
&= \frac{(\text{SHV} - \text{Non-Operating Assets} + \text{Debt})}{\text{SHV}} \\
&= \frac{prcc_f \times csho - ivst + dd1 + dltt + pstk}{prcc_f \times csho}
\end{aligned}
$$
where:
- $prcc_f$ = Share price
- $csho$ = Common shares outstanding
- $ivst$ = Short-term investments (Non-Operating Assets)
- $dd1$ = Long-term debt due in one year
- $dltt$ = Long-term debt
- $pstk$ = Preferred stock
------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Computing Leverage Effect from Compustat Data
```{r}
# Load required libraries
library(tidyverse)
# Load dataset
df_leverage_effect <- read.csv("data/leverage_effect.csv.gz") %>%
# Filter active firms
filter(costat == "A") %>%
# Drop missing values
drop_na() %>%
# Compute Shareholder Value (SHV)
mutate(shv = prcc_f * csho) %>%
# Compute Operating Business Value (OBV)
mutate(obv = shv - ivst + dd1 + dltt + pstk) %>%
# Compute Leverage Effect
mutate(leverage_effect = obv / shv) %>%
# Remove infinite values and non-positive leverage effects
filter(is.finite(leverage_effect), leverage_effect > 0) %>%
# Compute within-firm statistics
group_by(gvkey) %>%
mutate(
within_mean_le = mean(leverage_effect, na.rm = TRUE),
within_sd_le = sd(leverage_effect, na.rm = TRUE)
) %>%
ungroup()
# Summary statistics
mean_le <- mean(df_leverage_effect$leverage_effect, na.rm = TRUE)
max_le <- max(df_leverage_effect$leverage_effect, na.rm = TRUE)
# Plot histogram of leverage effect
hist(
df_leverage_effect$leverage_effect,
main = "Distribution of Leverage Effect",
xlab = "Leverage Effect",
col = "blue",
breaks = 30
)
# Compute coefficient of variation (CV)
cv_le <-
sd(df_leverage_effect$leverage_effect, na.rm = TRUE) / mean_le * 100
# Plot within-firm coefficient of variation histogram
df_leverage_effect %>%
group_by(gvkey) %>%
slice(1) %>%
ungroup() %>%
mutate(cv = within_sd_le / within_mean_le) %>%
pull(cv) %>%
hist(
main = "Within-Firm Coefficient of Variation",
xlab = "CV",
col = "red",
breaks = 30
)
```
## Economic Significance
The total wealth gain (or loss) resulting from a marketing event is given by:
$$
\Delta W_t = CAR_t \times MKTVAL_0
$$
where:
- $\Delta W_t$ = Change in firm value (gain or loss).
- $CAR_t$ = Cumulative abnormal return up to date $t$.
- $MKTVAL_0$ = Market value of the firm before the event window.
**Interpretation:**
- If $\Delta W_t > 0$: The event increased firm value.
- If $\Delta W_t < 0$: The event decreased firm value.
- The magnitude of $\Delta W_t$ reflects the economic impact of the marketing event in dollar terms.
By computing $\Delta W_t$, researchers can translate stock market reactions into tangible financial implications, helping assess the real-world significance of marketing decisions.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
```{r}
# Load necessary libraries
library(tidyverse)
# Simulated dataset of event study results
df_event_study <- tibble(
firm_id = 1:100,
# 100 firms
CAR_t = rnorm(100, mean = 0.02, sd = 0.05),
# Simulated CAR values
MKTVAL_0 = runif(100, min = 1e8, max = 5e9) # Market value in dollars
)
# Compute total wealth gain/loss
df_event_study <- df_event_study %>%
mutate(wealth_change = CAR_t * MKTVAL_0)
# Summary statistics of economic impact
summary(df_event_study$wealth_change)
# Histogram of total wealth gain/loss
hist(
df_event_study$wealth_change,
main = "Distribution of Wealth Change from Event",
xlab = "Wealth Change ($)",
col = "blue",
breaks = 30
)
```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
## Testing in Event Studies {#sec-testing-in-event-studies}
### Statistical Power in Event Studies
Statistical power refers to the ability to detect a true effect (i.e., identify significant abnormal returns) when one exists.
Power increases with:
- More firms in the sample → reduces variance and increases reliability.
- Fewer days in the event window → avoids contamination from other confounding factors.
Trade-Off:
- A longer event window captures delayed market reactions but risks contamination from unrelated events.
- A shorter event window reduces noise but may miss slow adjustments in stock prices.
Thus, an optimal event window balances precision (avoiding confounds) and completeness (capturing true market reaction).
### Parametric Tests
@brown1985using provide evidence that parametric tests perform well even under non-normality, as long as the sample includes at least five securities. This is because the distribution of abnormal returns converges to normality as the sample size increases.
#### Power of Parametric Tests
@kothari1997measuring highlights that the power to detect significant abnormal returns depends on:
- Sample size: More firms improve statistical power.
- Magnitude of abnormal returns: Larger effects are easier to detect.
- Variance of abnormal returns across firms: Lower variance increases power.
#### T-Test for Abnormal Returns
By applying the [Central Limit Theorem], we can use the t-test for abnormal returns:
$$
\begin{aligned}
t_{CAR} &= \frac{\overline{CAR_{it}}}{\sigma (CAR_{it})/\sqrt{n}} \\
t_{BHAR} &= \frac{\overline{BHAR_{it}}}{\sigma (BHAR_{it})/\sqrt{n}}
\end{aligned}
$$
**Assumptions:**
- Abnormal returns follow a normal distribution.
- Variance is equal across firms.
- No cross-sectional correlation in abnormal returns.
If these assumptions do not hold, the t-test will be misspecified, leading to unreliable inference.
Misspecification may occur due to:
- **Heteroskedasticity** (unequal variance across firms).
- **Cross-sectional dependence** (correlation in abnormal returns across firms).
- **Non-normality** of abnormal returns (though event study design often forces normality).
To address these concerns, [Patell Standardized Residuals](#patell-standardized-residual-psr) provide a robust alternative.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
#### Patell Standardized Residual {#patell-standardized-residual-psr}
@patell1976corporate developed the [Patell Standardized Residuals](#patell-standardized-residual-psr) (PSR), which standardizes abnormal returns to correct for estimation errors.
Since the market model relies on observations outside the event window, it introduces prediction errors beyond true residuals. PSR corrects for this:
$$
AR_{it} = \frac{\hat{u}_{it}}{s_i \sqrt{C_{it}}}
$$
where:
- $\hat{u}_{it}$ = estimated residual from the market model.
- $s_i$ = standard deviation of residuals from the estimation period.
- $C_{it}$ = correction factor accounting for estimation period variation.
The correction factor ($C_{it}$) is:
$$
C_{it} = 1 + \frac{1}{T} + \frac{(R_{mt} - \bar{R}_m)^2}{\sum_t (R_{mt} - \bar{R}_m)^2}
$$
where:
- $T$ = number of observations in the estimation period.
- $R_{mt}$ = market return at time $t$.
- $\bar{R}_m$ = mean market return.
This correction ensures abnormal returns are properly scaled, reducing bias from estimation errors.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Non-Parametric Tests
Non-parametric tests do not assume a specific return distribution, making them robust to non-normality and heteroskedasticity.
#### Sign Test
The Sign Test assumes symmetric abnormal returns around zero.
- Null hypothesis ($H_0$): Equal probability of positive and negative abnormal returns.
- Alternative hypothesis ($H_A$): More positive (or negative) abnormal returns than expected.
```{r, eval = FALSE}
# Perform a sign test using binomial test
binom.test(x = sum(CAR > 0), n = length(CAR), p = 0.5)
```
#### Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test
The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test allows for non-symmetry in returns.
- Use case: Detects shifts in the distribution of abnormal returns.
- More powerful than the sign test when return magnitudes matter.
```{r, eval = FALSE}
# Perform Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test
wilcox.test(CAR, mu = 0)
```
#### Generalized Sign Test
A more advanced sign test, comparing the proportion of positive abnormal returns to historical norms.
#### Corrado Rank Test
The Corrado Rank Test is a rank-based test for abnormal returns.
- Advantage: Accounts for cross-sectional dependence.
- More robust than the t-test under non-normality.
```{r}
# Load necessary libraries
library(tidyverse)
# Simulate abnormal returns (CAR)
set.seed(123)
df_returns <- tibble(
firm_id = 1:100, # 100 firms
CAR = rnorm(100, mean = 0.02, sd = 0.05) # Simulated CAR values
)
# Parametric T-Test for CAR
t_test_result <- t.test(df_returns$CAR, mu = 0)
# Non-parametric tests
sign_test_result <- binom.test(sum(df_returns$CAR > 0), n = nrow(df_returns), p = 0.5)
wilcox_test_result <- wilcox.test(df_returns$CAR, mu = 0)
# Print results
list(
T_Test = t_test_result,
Sign_Test = sign_test_result,
Wilcoxon_Test = wilcox_test_result
)
```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
## Sample in Event Studies
A practical question that often surprises newcomers to event studies is how few observations are typically involved. Marketing and finance applications routinely run on samples that would look anaemic in other empirical traditions, and yet they regularly yield publishable, interpretable results. A glance at the published record gives a sense of the range. @markovitch2008findings work with 71 events at the small end of the distribution; @wiles2012effect have a more typical setup with 572 acquisition announcements and 308 disposal announcements; @borah2014make sit at the upper end with 3,552 events. The lesson is not that sample size doesn't matter, larger samples buy more power and tighter inference, but that the *signal* in an event study comes from the sharpness of the event window relative to normal-return variation, not from raw $N$. With clean events and a well-specified normal-return model, a few dozen carefully curated cases can yield results that would survive in a much larger study with noisier identification.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
## Confounders in Event Studies
A major challenge in event studies is controlling for confounding events, which could bias the estimation of abnormal returns.
### Types of Confounding Events
[@mcwilliams1997event] suggest excluding firms that experience other major events within a two-day window around the focal event. These include:
- Financial announcements: Earnings reports, stock buybacks, dividend changes, IPOs.
- Corporate actions: Mergers, acquisitions, spin-offs, stock splits, debt defaults.
- Executive changes: CEO/CFO resignations or appointments.
- Operational changes: Layoffs, restructurings, lawsuits, joint ventures.
@fornell2006customer recommend:
- One-day event period: The date when Wall Street Journal publishes the ACSI announcement.
- Five-day window (before and after the event) to rule out other news (from PR Newswires, Dow Jones, Business Wires).
Events controlled for include:
- M&A, spin-offs, stock splits.
- CEO or CFO changes.
- Layoffs, restructurings, lawsuits.
A useful data source for identifying confounding events is **Capital IQ's Key Developments**, which captures almost all important corporate events.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Should We Exclude Confounded Observations?
@sorescu2017 investigated confounding events in short-term event windows using:
- RavenPack dataset (2000-2013).
- 3-day event windows for 3,982 US publicly traded firms.
**Key Findings:**
- The difference between the full sample and the sample without confounded events was statistically insignificant.
- **Conclusion:** Excluding confounded observations **may not be necessary** in short-term event studies.
**Why?**
- **Selection bias risk**: Researchers may selectively exclude events, introducing bias.
- **Increasing exclusions over time**: As time progresses, more events need to be excluded, reducing statistical power.
- **Short-term windows minimize confounder effects**.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Simulation Study: Should We Exclude Correlated and Uncorrelated Events?
To illustrate the impact of correlated and uncorrelated events, let's conduct a simulation study.
We consider three event types:
1. **Focal events** (events of interest).
2. **Correlated events** (events that often co-occur with focal events).
3. **Uncorrelated events** (random events that might coincide with focal events).
We will analyze the impact of **including vs. excluding** correlated and uncorrelated events.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
```{r, warning=FALSE}
# Load required libraries
library(dplyr)
library(ggplot2)
library(tidyr)
library(tidyverse)
# Parameters
n <- 100000 # Number of observations
n_focal <- round(n * 0.2) # Number of focal events
overlap_correlated <- 0.5 # Overlapping percentage between focal and correlated events
# Function to compute mean and confidence interval
mean_ci <- function(x) {
m <- mean(x)
ci <- qt(0.975, length(x)-1) * sd(x) / sqrt(length(x)) # 95% confidence interval
list(mean = m, lower = m - ci, upper = m + ci)
}
# Simulate data
set.seed(42)
data <- tibble(
date = seq.Date(
from = as.Date("2010-01-01"),
by = "day",
length.out = n
),
# Date sequence
focal = rep(0, n),
correlated = rep(0, n),
ab_ret = rnorm(n)
)
# Define focal events
focal_idx <- sample(1:n, n_focal)
data$focal[focal_idx] <- 1
true_effect <- 0.25
# Adjust the ab_ret for the focal events to have a mean of true_effect
data$ab_ret[focal_idx] <-
data$ab_ret[focal_idx] - mean(data$ab_ret[focal_idx]) + true_effect
# Determine the number of correlated events that overlap with focal and those that don't
n_correlated_overlap <-
round(length(focal_idx) * overlap_correlated)
n_correlated_non_overlap <- n_correlated_overlap
# Sample the overlapping correlated events from the focal indices
correlated_idx <- sample(focal_idx, size = n_correlated_overlap)
# Get the remaining indices that are not part of focal
remaining_idx <- setdiff(1:n, focal_idx)
# Check to ensure that we're not attempting to sample more than the available remaining indices
if (length(remaining_idx) < n_correlated_non_overlap) {
stop("Not enough remaining indices for non-overlapping correlated events")
}
# Sample the non-overlapping correlated events from the remaining indices
correlated_non_focal_idx <-
sample(remaining_idx, size = n_correlated_non_overlap)
# Combine the two to get all correlated indices
all_correlated_idx <- c(correlated_idx, correlated_non_focal_idx)
# Set the correlated events in the data
data$correlated[all_correlated_idx] <- 1
# Inflate the effect for correlated events to have a mean of
correlated_non_focal_idx <-
setdiff(all_correlated_idx, focal_idx) # Fixing the selection of non-focal correlated events
data$ab_ret[correlated_non_focal_idx] <-
data$ab_ret[correlated_non_focal_idx] - mean(data$ab_ret[correlated_non_focal_idx]) + 1
# Define the numbers of uncorrelated events for each scenario
num_uncorrelated <- c(5, 10, 20, 30, 40)
# Define uncorrelated events
for (num in num_uncorrelated) {
for (i in 1:num) {
data[paste0("uncorrelated_", i)] <- 0
uncorrelated_idx <- sample(1:n, round(n * 0.1))
data[uncorrelated_idx, paste0("uncorrelated_", i)] <- 1
}
}
# Define uncorrelated columns and scenarios
unc_cols <- paste0("uncorrelated_", 1:num_uncorrelated)
results <- tibble(
Scenario = c(
"Include Correlated",
"Correlated Effects",
"Exclude Correlated",
"Exclude Correlated and All Uncorrelated"
),
MeanEffect = c(
mean_ci(data$ab_ret[data$focal == 1])$mean,
mean_ci(data$ab_ret[data$focal == 0 |
data$correlated == 1])$mean,
mean_ci(data$ab_ret[data$focal == 1 &
data$correlated == 0])$mean,
mean_ci(data$ab_ret[data$focal == 1 &
data$correlated == 0 &
rowSums(data[, paste0("uncorrelated_", 1:num_uncorrelated)]) == 0])$mean
),
LowerCI = c(
mean_ci(data$ab_ret[data$focal == 1])$lower,
mean_ci(data$ab_ret[data$focal == 0 |
data$correlated == 1])$lower,
mean_ci(data$ab_ret[data$focal == 1 &
data$correlated == 0])$lower,
mean_ci(data$ab_ret[data$focal == 1 &
data$correlated == 0 &
rowSums(data[, paste0("uncorrelated_", 1:num_uncorrelated)]) == 0])$lower
),
UpperCI = c(
mean_ci(data$ab_ret[data$focal == 1])$upper,
mean_ci(data$ab_ret[data$focal == 0 |
data$correlated == 1])$upper,
mean_ci(data$ab_ret[data$focal == 1 &
data$correlated == 0])$upper,
mean_ci(data$ab_ret[data$focal == 1 &
data$correlated == 0 &
rowSums(data[, paste0("uncorrelated_", 1:num_uncorrelated)]) == 0])$upper
)
)
# Add the scenarios for excluding 5, 10, 20, and 50 uncorrelated
for (num in num_uncorrelated) {
unc_cols <- paste0("uncorrelated_", 1:num)
results <- results %>%
add_row(
Scenario = paste("Exclude", num, "Uncorrelated"),
MeanEffect = mean_ci(data$ab_ret[data$focal == 1 &
data$correlated == 0 &
rowSums(data[, unc_cols]) == 0])$mean,
LowerCI = mean_ci(data$ab_ret[data$focal == 1 &
data$correlated == 0 &
rowSums(data[, unc_cols]) == 0])$lower,
UpperCI = mean_ci(data$ab_ret[data$focal == 1 &
data$correlated == 0 &
rowSums(data[, unc_cols]) == 0])$upper
)
}
ggplot(results,
aes(
x = factor(Scenario, levels = Scenario),
y = MeanEffect,
ymin = LowerCI,
ymax = UpperCI
)) +
geom_pointrange() +
coord_flip() +
ylab("Mean Effect") +
xlab("Scenario") +
ggtitle("Mean Effect of Focal Events under Different Scenarios") +
geom_hline(yintercept = true_effect,
linetype = "dashed",
color = "red")
```
As depicted in the plot, the inclusion of correlated events demonstrates minimal impact on the estimation of our focal events. Conversely, excluding these correlated events can diminish our statistical power. This is true in cases of pronounced correlation.
However, the consequences of excluding unrelated events are notably more significant. It becomes evident that by omitting around 40 unrelated events from our study, we lose the ability to accurately identify the true effects of the focal events. In reality and within research, we often rely on the Key Developments database, excluding over 150 events, a practice that can substantially impair our capacity to ascertain the authentic impact of the focal events.
This little experiment really drives home the point -- you better have a darn good reason to exclude an event from your study!
------------------------------------------------------------------------
## Biases in Event Studies
Event studies are subject to several biases that can affect the estimation of abnormal returns, the validity of test statistics, and the interpretation of results. The biases below are not exhaustive, and additional concerns specific to particular event types or markets may arise; the discussion focuses on the ones that recur often enough to warrant routine attention.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Timing Bias: Different Market Closing Times
When firms in the sample trade on exchanges in different time zones, the very notion of "the day of the event" becomes ambiguous. @campbell1998econometrics flag this issue: a closing price recorded at 4 p.m. New York time and another at 4 p.m. Tokyo time correspond to substantially different information sets, and aggregating them as if they were contemporaneous obscures the true price reaction. The bias is especially acute for firms cross-listed on multiple exchanges or for events that release news during a specific time zone's trading hours, after some markets have closed and before others open.
The standard fixes line up directly with the source of the problem. Use synchronized closing prices wherever possible, drawing on a single reference exchange or on intraday quotes recorded at a uniform timestamp. When that is not feasible, define the event window relative to the firm's *primary* trading exchange and accept that the resulting estimate is conditional on that choice. In multi-exchange settings, reporting results separately by primary listing is a useful robustness exercise: substantial divergence is a flag that timing alignment is doing real work.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Upward Bias in Cumulative Abnormal Returns
A subtler bias arises in the *aggregation* of daily abnormal returns into cumulative returns. The mechanism is microstructural rather than statistical: transaction prices recorded at the bid or the ask, rather than at the midpoint, introduce small jumps that the abnormal-return calculation reads as price movement. Liquidity constraints amplify the effect, because thinly traded stocks tend to bounce between bid and ask prices in patterns that look like genuine return innovations. When these microstructural jumps are aggregated over a multi-day event window, the cumulative abnormal return inherits a small but systematic upward bias.
The fixes operate either at the input or at the inference stage. At the input stage, replace raw transaction prices with volume-weighted average prices (VWAP) or with bid-ask midpoints, both of which average out the microstructural noise. At the inference stage, apply heteroskedasticity-robust or microstructure-corrected standard errors, which keep the point estimate unchanged but widen the confidence interval to reflect the additional variance introduced by the bias. For events with very short windows (single trading day), the input-stage fix is more important; for longer windows where the noise averages out anyway, the inference-stage fix usually suffices.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Cross-Sectional Dependence Bias
Cross-sectional dependence in returns biases standard-deviation estimates downward, which in turn inflates test statistics whenever multiple firms experience the event on the same date. @mackinlay1997event flagged the issue early on, noting that the problem becomes acute when firms in the same industry or market share event dates and so face common shocks that the independence assumption simply cannot accommodate. @wiles2012effect document the consequences empirically: in concentrated industries, the dependence is severe enough to materially inflate test statistics, and the apparent significance of an event can dissolve once the correction is applied.
Two corrections are standard in the literature, and they target the bias from different angles. The **Calendar-Time Portfolio Abnormal Returns (CTAR)** approach [@jaffe1974special] reorganizes the data into calendar-time portfolios so that all firms experiencing the event on the same day enter as a single portfolio observation rather than as multiple correlated observations. The dependence problem disappears by construction because there is no longer cross-firm variation within a portfolio. The **time-series standard-error correction** of @brown1980measuring takes the opposite route: keep the firm-level structure but estimate the variance from the time-series of the cross-sectional aggregate, capturing the dependence in the variance estimate rather than averaging it away. Both approaches are well-tested in the literature; the choice between them often comes down to whether the analyst wants firm-level attribution (Brown-Warner) or pooled portfolio-level inference (Jaffe).
```{r}
# Load required libraries
library(sandwich) # For robust standard errors
library(lmtest) # For hypothesis testing
# Simulated dataset
set.seed(123)
df_returns <- data.frame(
event_id = rep(1:100, each = 10),
firm_id = rep(1:10, times = 100),
abnormal_return = rnorm(1000, mean = 0.02, sd = 0.05)
)
# Cross-sectional dependence adjustment using clustered standard errors
model <- lm(abnormal_return ~ 1, data = df_returns)
coeftest(model, vcov = vcovCL(model, cluster = ~event_id))
```
### Sample Selection Bias
Event studies often suffer from self-selection bias because firms choose to undertake the events they undertake (issuing equity, announcing an acquisition, recalling a product) on the basis of private information that the analyst does not observe. The firm's choice is, in effect, a treatment-assignment mechanism that depends on unobservables, and the resulting comparison between event firms and non-event firms reads partly as a treatment effect and partly as the difference in the unobservables that drove the decision. This is the canonical [omitted-variable bias](#sec-omitted-variable-bias) problem, with the omitted variable being whatever private information the firm acted on.
### Corrections for Sample Selection Bias
Several corrections are available, and the right one depends on the institutional details of the event and on what auxiliary information is available.
The **Heckman two-stage model** [@acharya1993value] is the parametric approach. A first-stage probit predicts the probability of experiencing the event from observable firm characteristics, and the resulting inverse-Mills ratio enters the second-stage regression of abnormal returns as a control for the unobserved selection mechanism. The strength of the approach is that it has a clear identification logic and a familiar implementation; the weakness is that it requires an exclusion restriction, a variable that affects the probability of the event but not the abnormal return directly, and such instruments are notoriously hard to find in event-study settings.
**Counterfactual-observation methods** are the non-parametric alternative. Two are common in event-study work. **[Propensity-score matching](#sec-propensity-scores)** pairs each event firm with a non-event firm that has similar observable characteristics, on the logic that conditional on observables the event is as good as random. **Switching regression** explicitly models the two regimes (event vs. no event) jointly with the selection mechanism, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in the relationship between firm characteristics and outcomes across the two regimes. Both are useful when the available observables are rich enough to capture the bulk of the selection process.
The remainder of this section walks through each correction in turn, with a code example for the Heckman and propensity-score-matching cases.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. **Heckman Selection Model**
A Heckman selection model can be used when private information influences both event participation and abnormal returns.
**Examples**: @chen2009does; @wiles2012effect; @fang2015timing
**Steps:**
1. **First Stage (Selection Equation):** Model the firm's probability of experiencing the event using a Probit regression.
2. **Second Stage (Outcome Equation):** Model abnormal returns, controlling for the estimated Mills ratio ($\lambda$).
```{r}
# Load required libraries
library(sampleSelection)
# Simulated dataset for Heckman model
set.seed(123)
df_heckman <- data.frame(
firm_id = 1:500,
event = rbinom(500, 1, 0.3), # Event occurrence (selection)
firm_size = runif(500, 1, 10), # Firm characteristic
abnormal_return = rnorm(500, mean = 0.02, sd = 0.05)
)
# Introduce selection bias by correlating firm_size with event occurrence
df_heckman$event[df_heckman$firm_size > 7] <- 1
# Heckman Selection Model
heckman_model <- selection(
selection = event ~ firm_size, # Selection equation
outcome = abnormal_return ~ firm_size, # Outcome equation
data = df_heckman
)
# Summary of Heckman model
summary(heckman_model)
```
**Interpretation**
- If the Mills ratio ($\lambda$) is significant, it indicates that private information affects CARs.
- Weak instruments can lead to multicollinearity, making the second-stage estimates unreliable.
2. **Propensity Score Matching**
PSM matches event firms with similar non-event firms, controlling for selection bias.
**Examples of PSM in Finance and Marketing:**
- **Finance:** [@iskandar2013valuation, @doan2021does, @masulis2011venture].
- **Marketing:** [@warren2017how, @borah2014make, @cao2013wedded].
```{r}
# Load required libraries
library(MatchIt)
# Simulated dataset
set.seed(123)